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SYMPOSIUM DEBATE TRANSCRIPT: THE PROMISE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: REALISM VERSUS LEGALISM.
This debate took place at Notre Dame Law School on February 21, 2020 as
part of the Volume 10 Symposium. The Symposium featured two panels and a
debate, all incorporating the theme of International Law & the Rule of Law.
Recordings of all three sessions, as well as opening remarks from one of the
Journal’s faculty advisors, Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell, and the dean of
Notre Dame Law School, G. Marcus Cole, can be found on the Journal of
International & Comparative Law website.1
Moderator: Professor Michael C. Desch (Department of Political Science,
University of Notre Dame)
Debaters: Professor John Mearsheimer (Department of Political Science,
University of Chicago) and Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell (Notre Dame Law
School)
TRANSCRIPT
Introduction (Rocheville): Good afternoon, everybody. Thank you all for
joining us for our featured lunchtime debate: “The Promise of International Law:
Realism versus Legalism.” My name is Brad Rocheville, the editor-in-chief of
the Journal of International & Comparative Law, here at the Law School and it
is my pleasure to introduce the moderator, Professor Michael C. Desch.
Professor Desch is the Packey J. Dee Professor of International Relations at the
University of Notre Dame and the founding director of the Notre Dame
International Security Center. He specializes in international relations,
American foreign policy, international security, political thought, and world
politics. Professor Desch previously served two terms as chair of Notre Dame's
Department of Political Science and was the founding director of the Scowcroft
Institute of International Affairs and the first holder of the Robert M. Gates
Chair in Intelligence and National Security Decision-making at the George Bush
School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. He also
served as assistant director and senior research associate at Harvard
University's Olin Institute of Strategic Studies. Professor Desch has written a
number of articles and books, including Cult of the Irrelevant: The Waning
Influence of Social Science on National Security. He previously worked for the
federal government at the U.S. Department of State, as a congressional research
service for a U.S. Senator. Professor Desch received an M.A. of International
Relations, a PhD in Political Science from The University of Chicago. Please
join me in welcoming Professor Michael C. Desch.
Desch: Hi. Thanks for the kind introduction. It is ten times longer than the
introduction that I'm going to give our two speakers. Nonetheless, it's
1
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appropriate. My colleagues and I are thrilled to co-sponsor this event,
particularly this top of the fight card event, which I'm re-titling “The Promise or
False Promise of International Law”. Each of our legal pugilists is going to get
ten minutes of opening remarks and then they'll get five minutes of follow-up,
and then we're going to go to Q&A from the audience, and I'll give each of our
speakers a brief last word. Mary Ellen O'Connell needs no introduction in this
forum and I'm not going to give her one, other than to say that she is the Robert
and Mary Marion Short Professor of Law and a research professor in
international dispute resolution. She has published two books with Cambridge
University Press that came out in 2019, so we're looking forward to hearing her
in this debate. On the other side of the card, we have Professor John
Mearsheimer. He is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of
Political Science at The University of Chicago. He also has a recent book out:
The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams in International Realities. Professor
Mearsheimer will speak first.
Mearsheimer: Thank you very much for the kind introduction. Thank you,
Mary Ellen, for inviting me to visit today for this debate and thanks all for
coming out to listen. The subject before us today is the relevance of international
law for international politics. This boils down to the question of how
international law affects state behavior. Before I get into the heart and soul of
my argument, I want to make two preliminary points. The first is that I'm talking
about international law only. I'm not talking about domestic law. And, as will
become clear by the end of my talk, I have very different views of domestic law
and international law. My second point is that I view international institutions
and the rules that are at the heart of them as effectively the same as international
law. I consider laws, rules, and institutions as within the same package of
entities. Occasionally, I'll use the words “law” and “rules”, but my arguments
apply to both. Now, in the context of discussing realism and legalism, I'm simply
going to give you one realist view on international law. I don't know if I agree
with Hans Morgenthau or Kenneth Walsh on every point. You will get John
Mearsheimer's view of international law and I'm going to make two major
points. The first is that many people think realists believe that international law
and international institutions don't matter at all. Some people even say that we
realists believe that international law and international rules are dangerous, that
we must get rid of these things. Nothing could be further from the truth. I just
want to make that clear. Realists like me believe that international law and
institutions matter. International institutions matter in big ways for several
reasons. First, if you're interested in running the world, there's no way to do it in
our highly globalized world without international institutions. There is a
tremendous amount of interdependence in terms of economics, security, and
politics among nations. There's no way that a great power like the United States
can manage things like trade without rules, without laws. Thus, they are
absolutely essential. Consider the Cold War, in which the United States created
a Western order that included NATO, the EU, the IMF, and the World Bank,
among others. These are all institutions that we needed and they were comprised
of rules and laws. So, the idea that a realist like me thinks great powers don't
need institutions is erroneous. Second, the United States writes the rules in ways
that favor positions it anticipates taking later. That's just the way it works. Third,
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relatedly, this strategy is really useful for coercing minor powers. International
law and institutions are really great for the United States because they help it
achieve its goals. Consider the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is how the
United States prevents countries around the world from acquiring nuclear
weapons. The United States likes nuclear weapons. However, it does not believe
anyone else should be allowed to have them. And it uses international laws to
prevent others from getting those weapons. The United States likes the
international regime because of its simplicity. The fourth and final reason that
America favors the international legal regime is because it permits the U.S. to
break rules it does not like. Furthermore, it is very important to realists that
international law and international institutions cannot force states to obey the
law when those states think it is in their vital interest not to obey the law. Basic
realist logic justifies this claim. And I think this is the point where Mary Ellen
and I fundamentally disagree. I think that Mary Ellen and people of her
persuasion believe that international law and international institutions can
exercise coercive power over states when their vital interests are at stake, and
that those states will be compelled to obey the rules. Realist 101 logic makes me
think that this is impossible. The basic argument here is that states operate in an
anarchic system. There's no higher authority above states. States can never know
the intentions of other states. They wake up one day living next to Adolf Hitler
who has considerable power and malign intentions. You dial 911 to call the
international system and there's nobody on the other end. In that kind of world,
you have to make sure you have as much power as possible. To the Americans
in the room, how many of you go to bed at night worrying about Canada or
Mexico attacking the United States? The answer is "none" and the reason is
because America is like Godzilla surrounded by Bambis. That is the best way to
survive in a system that lacks a higher authority according to basic realist logic.
This tells us that when you're in a self-help world and the law says you have to
do something that is at odds with your perceived vital interests, you're going to
break the law or disobey the rules. This is not to say that you're a constant
lawbreaker because, again, my argument is that great powers write rules they
like and therefore usually obey. Nonetheless, there are those situations where
international rules are at odds with a nation’s vital interests and that nation then
violates those rules. This is fundamentally different from domestic politics
because a higher authority exists in there. What Thomas Hobbes called the
Leviathan, we call the state. When you get into trouble, you call the police and
your lawyer. And in that context, law has a different meaning—not a completely
different meaning, but a very different meaning. I think Mary Ellen and I would
agree completely on the importance of the rule of law inside the black box. But
once outside the black box and in the realm of international politics, I
believe international law matters. The world Mary Ellen envisions can only exist
is if you escape international anarchy. A really terrific little book that you can
read on the subject is Lowes Dickinson's book, entitled The European Anarchy.
Dickinson, one of the founding fathers of the League of Nations after World War
I, invented the concept anarchy as it applies to international politics. This is a
brilliant little book and he basically said that as long as you operate in an
anarchic world, states are going to behave the way I argue that they will. And he
said that if you want to escape that world, one must transcend anarchy and move
into hierarchy—e.g., create an international system that looks like what you have
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in domestic politics. In other words, a world state. Well, for better or for worse,
I do not envision the rise of a world state because the most powerful political
ideology on the planet is nationalism, and nationalism requires nation-states.
Nation-states do not disappear. We are going to live in a world of nation-states
as far as the eye can see. That means we're going to continue to live
in international anarchy. And as long as we live in international anarchy, there's
no way the great powers are ever going to obey international law or the rules
that are at the heart of institutions if they think those laws or rules clash with
their vital interests. Thank you.
Desch: Thanks John. On time and on target. Mary Ellen, you may begin.
O'Connell: I don't know about all these war metaphors and fighting metaphors.
I'm here for an exchange of intellectual ideas. I want to just promote with all of
you a better idea than the one we just heard. This has nothing to do with force
and violence and everything to do with persuasion, beauty, and attracting all of
you to a new way of thinking. Professor Mearsheimer deserves our respect. He
deserves even our admiration. Imagine that Professor Mearsheimer, and just a
few others, have succeeded in making this realist idea you just heard the
dominant idea in U.S. foreign policy. My aim in this debate is to win all of you,
but him, especially, away from that idea, in favor of what was once the true and
important goal of U.S. foreign policy: promoting the rule of law in the world.
That was the central aim of U.S. foreign policy for 175 years. I think we can get
it back and we can do it starting today, right here. I'm going to make this
argument in three parts. First, I'm going to define some terms. Second, I'm going
to explain why legalism is superior to realism. And finally, I will show the harm
that persisting with realism causes and argue that only a return to fidelity of law
will lead to a better future for everyone listening in this room, in the overflow
room, and around the world at large. Legalism, like realism, refers to a set of
beliefs about the way the world works. Realists believe the world works on the
basis of human survival instinct. They maintain that individuals seek selfinterest to accumulate wealth and other material goods, and that nations, just like
individuals, act on self-interest too. Realists believe that individuals and states
are locked in a competition with each other for wealth and will use force to
achieve a desired outcome in that competition. Legalists, on the other hand,
understand that the survival instinct that motivates human beings constitutes just
one among many instincts. Although people are self-interested, they are also
interested in the welfare of others. Oftentimes, they elect to promote another
person's self-interest at the expense of their own. Human beings can be
motivated by altruism, selflessness, spirituality, and emotion, as well as
materialism. Law relies on people being both self-interested and concerned
about the welfare of others. It thereby creates neutral principles and policies to
resolve disputes and guide conduct. Law is based fundamentally on accepting
and complying with these neutral rules and processes, regardless of coercion.
Coercive enforcement is a part of law, but law does not depend on coercion. It
is not essential to law. What is essential to the rule of law is that force is
subordinated to law—that the physically powerful are not treated as superior to
others under the law. The subjects of law are equal, whether human beings,
organizations, or states. Professor Mearsheimer is right: it is hard to imagine the
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international community coercing the United States if the U.S. doesn't want to
obey a particular rule. The international community expects voluntary
compliance, with the occasional need for some kind of enforcement, and it does
have means to make it costly even for the United States to disobey. Yet,
fundamentally, it's about the belief in law, that we once held very dearly in
America, and that we can again. Legalism promotes the idea that law and legal
means are the moral and ethical approaches to problem-solving. Law is neither
government nor liberalism. Governments administer states and represent them
on the international plane. Law precedes government and it is essential to create
government. It is necessary to create states. States are not organic creatures like
people or animals; instead, they are legal constructs that need the law to exist.
Without law, there is no institution of the state, let alone a governmental
institution of the kind that Professor Mearsheimer likes. He very much likes
NATO and we just heard him say he likes world trade institutions like the WTO.
Respect for law and improvement in the law that founded these entities is needed
to improve them for the good of the United States and all states. Finally,
liberalism is not law but a set of beliefs. However, it is a set of beliefs about the
proper relationship between individuals and their governments within states.
Liberalism relies on law to limit government control of individuals.
Consequently, liberalism has only limited relevance to international law; I share
many of Professor Mearsheimer's criticisms of liberal hegemonists who
violate international law and use military force to promote their liberal beliefs.
Why is legalism a better idea than realism? Both legalism and realism are
ideas—basic human constructs. However, law is a far older concept that has
withstood the test of time. Law is the idea we return to after catastrophic failures
to obey the law, such as in World War I, World War II, Vietnam, and in 2003
after the Iraq invasion. Law us about the human capacity for altruism and the
virtue of obedience to law, even when our action is done wholly in the interests
of another. These are the ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas, and they should be
contrasted with the ideas of another Thomas—that Professor Mearshimer has
already mentioned—Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes, a 17th-century British
commentator, saw life as nasty, brutish, and short. He viewed human beings as
in a perpetual war of all against all and that we would never conduct ourselves
with generosity and respect for each other, unless coerced by government or
anarchy. How many of you in this room need to be coerced or punished into
being generous to another human being? Where would charitable donations be
if fear was the only motivating factor? And, nevertheless, Hobbes' views
influenced the development of realism, which was first invented in Europe in
the 1930s, and aimed precisely at undermining international law. Early realism
then traveled to the U.S. through the work of Hans Morgenthau, a German
refugee and long-time political scientist at the University of Chicago. He
promoted this idea in a book first published in 1948. In a series of 1951 lectures
at the University of Chicago, U.S. diplomat George Kennan called on the U.S.
government to abandon what he called the legalistic, moralistic, approach in
U.S. foreign policy. Kennan wanted the U.S. to take advantage of its
technological prowess at the end of World War II to amass weapons and military
assets. He hoped this approach would get the U.S. to abandon the rule of law as
part of foreign policy. Kennan thought the U.S. could become the newest global
coercive power by dictating policy to other nations for its own material benefit.

2021

JICL SYMPOSIUM DEBATE TRANSCRIPT

96

Accordingly, the military-industrial complex was born and a thirty-year slide
away from the rule of law—first abroad and then at home—began. The U.S. has
been paying dearly for increases in spending on weapons and military assets as
well as the abandonment of the rule of law. I'll provide just a few examples.
First, consider the abject failure to commit the resources necessary to deal with
the true existential threat this country faces, for example climate change and
environmental collapse. We all know the harms of this failure: global
pandemics, sea level rise, drought, flood, storms, famines, mass-species die-offs,
uncontrolled fires in Australia, Brazil, and California. Professor Mearsheimer
might say this is not the fault of realism, but thanks to the mono-focus on
projecting coercive power in the world, the U.S. will spend $989 billion dollars
in one year on its military budget. The U.S. is already in debt to the tune of $23
trillion dollars, much of this sum being held by China. Yet, while the entire
budget of the United Nations' environment program is just $222 million, the U.S.
pays only a small fraction of that. Just think about what could be done about
climate change if only half of this year's U.S. military budget went to address it.
And second, when you spend all of that money on weapons, what do you do
next? You go to war. Realism is behind this country's endless wars. Professor
Mearsheimer will say that he opposed all foolish wars, but in his book, The
Grand Delusion, he discusses countering China's growing economic and
military might and suggests there may be a need to go to war with China. Things
have gotten so out of hand in America’s lawless campaign to project military
power that even the U.S. Congress is working to establish legal constraints on
the executive’s ability to go to war. Two historic war-powers resolutions have
now been passed, restraining war with Iran and Yemen. This is the right
approach for the future and the U.S. needs to continue it. These last years of the
superior U.S. economy should be spent rebuilding the rule of law and restoring
a sense of prestige in legal compliance over violation. The world should no
longer give in to the idea that one state can dictate the law, make the rules, and
break them at will. If the U.S. wants the world legalism can deliver, it needs to
respect international law and accept it for what it is. The future—your future—
needs to embrace legalism and reject realism.
Desch: Thank you Mary Ellen. The next round is going to be five minutes of
exchange between John and Mary Ellen. For the folks in the overflow room, if
you would like to send me a question for either of our speakers during the third
and final phase of the debate, send them to me at [EMAIL] and I'll try to get it
in at the Q&A.
Mearsheimer: First of all, I didn't talk about U.S. policy at all, but I just want
to be clear—as Mary Ellen made clear—that I have opposed U.S. foreign policy
since 1989, including all of these crazy wars, and almost all of my fellow realists
have opposed these wars as well. These wars have been promoted by liberal
institutionalists,
liberal
interventionists,
liberal
hegemonists,
or
neoconservatives. As regards her first point, that I've had this profound influence
on American policy and world politics, I wish it were true. We would have had
many fewer wars had I been in charge. However, this is not a debate about
agency versus structure, or how much power individuals have versus the
structured system. And I am a Hobbesian. Hobbes talks about the state of nature;
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I talk about anarchy. They're synonymous. He talks about individuals in the state
of nature; I talk about states in anarchy. And my basic argument is that when
you don't have a higher authority you cannot be certain about the intentions of
individuals in Hobbes' case and states in my case. When you encounter
somebody very powerful, you have no choice to privilege survival and the
balance of power, and that causes you to violate international law. Mary Ellen
never addressed that point nor did she show any flaw in my logic, and I believe
that to run me off the table she must show some flaw in my line of thinking.
Regarding her point that the United States for about 170 years behaved
according to the rule of law, I respond that this behavior did not occur until after
realists had started pervading bad ideas in the wake of World War II. Remember
America’s checkered history. The U.S. started out as thirteen measly colonies
strung out along the Atlantic seaboard. Colonists marched across the continent
to the Pacific Ocean, murdered huge numbers of Native Americans and stole
their land. What is now the southwestern United States was stolen from Mexico.
America invaded Canada in 1812 for the purpose of making it part of the United
States. The only reason the Caribbean is not part of the United States today is
not because the U.S. didn't have a big enough appetite to annex it, but rather
because the northern states didn't want more slave-holding states in the union.
When Adolf Hitler invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, he often talked
about the fact that his model was the United States. He referred to the Volga
River as "mein Mississippi." He described America as a country that really
knows how to create "lebensraum" (colonization). The United States is one of
the most ruthless great powers in modern history. The idea that it was promoting
or adhering to international norms and international law for 170 years doesn't
bear much resemblance to the story I know. Mary Ellen also pointed out that
states have other interests besides survival. I think that's absolutely right: states
have other interests and those interests are important. However, survival has to
be the primary interest because if you don't survive you can't pursue other
interests. And this brings back Hobbes who argued for a special priority on
survival. This priority explains why states will disobey laws in situations where
such laws are perceived to clash with their vital interests. Mary Ellen says that
law does not depend on coercion. However, I think that law depends to some
extent on coercion. It doesn't depend exclusively on coercion. However,
international law faces significant limits without nation states. People can't just
depend on the interests or moral virtue of the actors. While I do not disagree that
these interests and virtues are important, Mary Ellen’s approach still requires the
presence of a coercive entity called the state or the world state. Finally, I would
clarify that I was not trying to equate law with liberalism. I think that law is
terribly important to running the international system and I think it's true in
domestic politics as well. I've read a number of articles and books over the years
where people talk about how much emphasis the Third Reich placed on domestic
law. They really cared about law. Thus, law is very important on its own and I
wouldn't equate it with liberalism. My simple point is that when you're talking
about international law, it (1) has great virtues, but (2) there are limits to what it
can accomplish compared to domestic law because of anarchy and structure—
not because of John Mearsheimer.
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Desch: Thank you, John. Mary Ellen, five more minutes. I'll keep track. I'm in
charge of the rule of law here.
O'Connell: John underplays how much influence he's had and he presents
himself as humble for playing such a small role. I do not say that the liberal
hegemonists who have used military force to try to promote their various goals—
such as human rights, arms control, or counterterrorism—are good realists.
However, I object to the idea that unless you have a military advantage in
international relations you will not survive in the world. This view presents
international relations as a competition in which the only moral or correct thing
for a national leader to do is ascend to the top of a military asset pile. That idea,
as wrong as it may be, has seeped into America’s foreign policy establishment
at the expense of a commitment to the rule of law in the world. This has made
us very vulnerable and put the it in a very dangerous position. Within nine years,
this country will have the second-largest economy in the world, not the first, and
then many of Professor Mearsheimer's views look very different. However, I
suggest to you that by then it may be too late. Originally, I thought China would
escape the realist notion that it is a good idea to spend significant resources,
including intellectual capital, on developing new weapons, but China seems to
be turning toward realism because it sees that the U.S. has been so committed to
it. Thus, many nations have come to understand that the only way a country gets
respect from the United States is to have a bigger military. We now find
ourselves trapped in this realist mentality that the only thing to do is to have
more weapons, to spend more money on the military, to fight proxy wars, or—
as John suggests in The Grand Delusion—that we may even have to go to war
with China. This terrifies me most of all because I think invading Iraq was as
wrong as prolonging the war in Afghanistan. Yet, this is the logic of realism that
we must escape. Professor Mearsheimer says we cannot escape it because I'm
not properly describing the true structure of the world, but that “structure” is an
idea. We cooked this up; this is Thomas Hobbes' view of the world. It wasn't
Hugo Grotius’ view of the world. Hugo Grotius, Hobbes' contemporary, could
see that when people come together and cooperate—indeed, even sacrifice—a
fundamental rule of law system becomes possible. Only then could structures of
law be formed. And what we've lost through the realist onslaught is a basic belief
in the human capacity to care about others and care about the law. And while
Professor Mearsheimer says it works very differently domestically and
internationally, I'm afraid that it does not. For example, when the United States
breaches treaties, summarily executes people overseas using drones, ignores the
most important treaties it has ever drafted and ratified—e.g., the United Nations
Charter with its core prohibition on the use of force—why does that stop at the
border? The U.S. often believes that it can break every rule it has ever made.
Today, in America we have misplaced our priorities. We erroneously believe
that what matters is having more money or Twitter followers. If that's the kind
of material power that counts, then why should anyone care what a judge says?
Why would we care that the congressional designation of spendable monies is
allocated toward the military and not some other project? We are seeing the law
degraded at home because we have lost the proper understanding of law in the
first place. Law is not about being coerced, but instead about commitment to a
set of ideas for how to regulate our lives together. It involves mutual principles
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that don't recognize hegemony or superiority based on money. Law is based on
humanity and it applies to groups and people. Moreover, you can have law
without government; this has been the best way to characterize the structural
world beyond the state and has been the dream of the United States. Has America
lived up to this dream? Absolutely not. I wish that Professor Mearsheimer had
mentioned slavery as the original sin of this country, a clear violation of what
we used to understand as natural law. That understanding has been eroded by
the onslaught of realism, the new scientism, that is derived from a scientific view
that material evidence is all that matters. We've lost the great ideas of law. That's
why I'm so happy we're having this debate at Notre Dame Law School, because
here we understand natural law and that there never should have been slavery or
a use of military force to slaughter native peoples in this country. We've lost
original ideas of natural law in modern science, but we can get them back. We
are now capable of moving to a deeper and richer understanding of the law at
home and abroad because we are seeing the cost of not having those old ideas.
We have become too comfortable stripping them away and entertaining the false
materialist notion that “if we have more, we can get more” because the U.S. is
presently ahead in the technological game. Well, it will not be ahead very much
longer. There is a movement toward generosity and toward understanding these
more basic natural law ideas. I see this in the vast movement for the environment
and in the struggle for good governance from Hong Kong to Chile. Many people
around the word now recognize that this realist, top-down, hegemonic, structural
view is wrong. The U.S. founding fathers understood that the U.S. may not
always abide natural law. However, they nonetheless maintained that America
was established on a natural law basis and that all Americans have an inalienable
right to live independently. Furthermore, those founding fathers had the genius
to see that natural law is superior to government and that from it comes a
commitment to law. This approach should carry greater influence over our
foreign policy. We would have a much better world today had we not succumbed
to the competitive, selfish, and self-interested ideas of realism.
Desch: Thank you very much, Professor O'Connell. In my view the institution
of moderator is misnamed. The moderator should not moderate, the moderator
should sharpen the debate. Thus, with that presumption in mind, John began by
observing that from the perspective of realism, international law in terms of even
great powers abiding by its rules should be evident much of the time. The
exception is when, in his view, international law contradicts the vital interests of
the state. What is the poster-child example for you of vital state interests
trumping international law and how often should we expect to see that in the
world? Mary Ellen, I want you to answer the opposite side of this coin and
identify some poster children, or at least a poster child, in which you think
international law trumps vital state interests. John?
Mearsheimer: When vital interests trumped international law? Well, the Iraq
war in 2003 offers a classic example for when American policymakers and a
large chunk of the American public believed that vital interests trumped
international law. However, the reality in almost all these cases is that laws are
interpreted in different ways. When the United States violates international law,
it goes to a law school and finds a bunch of clever law professors to explain why
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violating international law is not really violating international law. You folks are
all trained to make any argument defending any side of a given case. Therefore,
lawyers provide the U.S. government with an explanation that it is actually
following international law when it is not.
Desch: How often, in your view Professor Mearsheimer, do you see—or expect
to see—states directly and overtly violating international law to promote their
own interests?
Mearsheimer: Not much at all. As I said before, because the great powers write
the rules and laws they don't have to violate them much at all. Yet we mostly
hear about the cases in which the law is violated. Leading up to the Iraq War,
and I think Mary Ellen is correct about the cause of the war in 1999, which was
itself a violation of international law. There are a number of similar cases, but
they are high profile matters that involve military conflict of some variety.
However, the vast majority of the time the United States is obeying the rules
because it wrote them. And furthermore, in this highly interdependent world that
we live in, there is no way you can run it without rules. I think President Donald
Trump, with his profound hostility towards international institutions and belief
that you can essentially do away with them and the United States can run the
world out of its back pocket, is delusional. And again, when we waged the Cold
War, we built institutions. I know Mary Ellen doesn't want to hear this, but we're
loading up the shotgun to deal with China; that's what the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) was. It was foolish of President Trump to withdraw from the
TPP. The TPP was an institution that was created by the Obama Administration
for the purpose of putting the crosshairs on China.
Desch: Thanks. Mary Ellen, an example of a poster child of international law
trumping vital national interests?
O'Connell: I just don't see the duality in your question. It is in the U.S.' national
interests to comply with international law, so I don't make the separation that
you do. Everything that Professor Mearsheimer said is enhanced if you believe
that the U.S. has an honest—as opposed to a cynical—view of the law. The TPP
is a desirable treaty. But who's going to make a treaty with the United States
today, when the U.S. walks away from treaties and says it can just tear them up.
If we decide treaties are not in our vital interests, we'll just walk away. We'll
quote Mearsheimer. You can't have your cake and eat it. If treaties of any kind—
trade treaties or arms control treaties—are going to work, they must be shown a
level of acceptance and respect by leading countries like the United States.
Treaties that are not respected will not produce benefits. True, we skated through
the post-Cold-War period for a while saying "well we can have this law but we
don't need to bother about that law." That's the story of the Iraq Invasion of 2003.
The U.S. simply claimed "we still deserve the prestige of law, because we have
a legal argument in the form of a letter to the Security Council." No international
professional lawyer who understands the law on the use of force, unless working
for the U.S. government or British government, or recently employed by them,
believes the Iraq Invasion was lawful. And now, where are we? Do you know
how many justifications under public international law President Trump has
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made for his unlawful uses of force? One. He sent a letter after the killing of
Qasem Soleimani. That's it. He ignored the uses of military force against Syria,
the hundreds of drone strikes carried out by the U.S. around the world, and his
planned attack against Iran last summer. Why should President Trump bother?
He's read Professor Mearsheimer’s work. He knows the lawyers will just tell
him he can do what he wants and that he doesn't have to obey the law. Thus, the
impact of realism is that we no longer understand what the law is. Law properly
understood binds people and nations on a comprehensive basis, first and
foremost as natural law. That's not law we make up. That's law that we discern
through our ethical and moral understanding to be required for how to behave
with each other in ways of respect and dignity. That's what law is. It has plenty
of positive law layered on top of it, but if you ignore that structural aspect of
law, you're never going to get the benefits of law that Professor Mearsheimer
correctly wants.
Desch: Okay, we have a question from an undergraduate who is in the overflow
room. For you, Mary Ellen, that will maybe prompt you to elaborate your last
point. Nick writes: what exactly does Professor O'Connell mean by the notion
that law precedes states. It seems like a very counterintuitive idea. Is she
speaking of a divine law or a natural law? If she is speaking of civil law, how
could it exist before the state does?
O'Connell: We don't talk about civil law as distinct in the field of international
law. International law has three components: positive law made through treaties,
the development of custom among nations, and certain general principles that
are found through comparing national law. This framework accounts for the fact
that law is binding; the principles that we make through positive law should be
respected and should change and be developed only through authoritative
processes: treaty-making and customary law-making. Natural law sets the outer
limits of the positive law we can make. It tells us we can never have a treaty that
would allow the use of military force because the use of military force is
fundamentally prohibited as a feature of natural law. Genocide is also prohibited
by natural law. Consequently, you could never have a treaty that permits one
state to wipe out a group of people in another state. That is natural law and you
have to have both natural and positive law to have a truly effective legal system.
Where does the institution of the state come from? Take the U.S. for example.
It was not a sovereign state in 1776. The U.S. wanted to be accepted into the
community of states and it had to make the legal argument that it deserved
recognition as a state in accordance with certain factors. These factors include
having a population, a sense of boundaries, a government in effective control,
and that the young nation would honor its international commitments. That's
how any entity becomes a state. It is what the Palestinians are searching for now:
a sense of acceptance into a system of states. For international law to exist at all,
and to offer that status to any entity like Palestinians or like early Americans,
there must be an international system grounded in natural law. However, as our
founding fathers understood, the governments of the many states they wanted
America to join already accepted international law as their common bond;
natural law is the source of the definitions that define when nations qualify for
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admission into that club of states. Therefore, without law, you don't get states,
let alone governance.
Desch: Okay, I'm going to throw it open to the audience. The jeopardy rule is in
force, meaning whatever you say has to be brief and end with a question mark.
One question per person. Andrew, we'll start out with you, and then Roger.
Andrew: Thank you to you both. You both alluded to the rise of China,
especially on the world stage. And I know China has increasingly exerted more
influence in the United Nations. I'm wondering how both of you see the next
decade. How do you see American involvement with international rules of law,
particularly as they change in response to China's growing influence? Especially
for you, Professor Mearsheimer, do you think there will arise situation in which
the U.S. will have to disobey, like you said in your theory?
Mearsheimer: On the subject of China, as Mary Ellen said, the Chinese are
realists to the core. She thinks it is a recent development. I don't think it's a recent
development. When I go to China and I open my talks, I say "it's good to be back
among my people," because China is a thoroughly realist country. Mary Ellen
thinks that it's because they read my book or are imitating the United States. No,
it's because China was weak from roughly 1850 to 1950. They refer to that
period as “the century of national humiliation”. The Chinese fully understand
that weakness in international politics precedes falling prey to the other great
powers. Accordingly, many nations really want to be powerful. This has been
very difficult for Americans to understand because we were born into this very
powerful country and we take it for granted. However, were we a small country
surrounded by gorillas we would think about international politics in
fundamentally different ways—and I can guarantee you the Chinese are nervous
at the thought of being weak. They want to really be powerful and they'll do
everything they can to push the United States out of Asia—first beyond the first
island chain and then beyond the second island chain. As I tell them when I go
to China, if I were sitting in Beijing and I were the national security advisor to
the Chinese government, I'd want the Americans out too. However, I'm an
American and I have no intention of letting China push the U.S. beyond the first
island chain, much less the second island chain. And that's what's going to lead
to the clash. Regarding international institutions, this is a fascinating question.
The U.N. is basically useless for modulating or dealing with the U.S.-China
competition because of the veto. If the U.S. pushes something the Chinese do
not like, they will veto it, and vice versa. Like in the Cold War, the U.N. will not
be very useful. What's actually going to happen here is that the Chinese and the
Americans will create their own institutions. During the Cold War, the West had
several institutions that included NATO, the European Union, International
Monetary Fund, and World Bank. On the eastern side, you had Comecon and
the Warsaw Pact. Those were the Soviet-dominated institutions and those
institutions were designed to wage the Cold War. This is the road that we are
headed down today with the Asian Investment International Bank (AIIB) and
the Belt and Road. This was what the TPP was all about and why the Trump
Administration was foolish to walk away from it. I'll be long dead by the time
we can tell for sure whether I'm right, but what I think you're going to see is the
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creation of the set of Chinese-dominated institutions and American-dominated
institutions for purposes of waging the competition that I think is almost sure to
occur between those two countries. I do think it is a tragedy, but my view of
international politics is a tragic one.
Desch: Mary Ellen, to throw a related question on the table, Nick Carter, another
undergraduate, asks how a return to legalism by the United States—were it to
happen—would help to better manage the rise of China than John's realpolitik
redux approach?
O'Connell: Great question. I'm a student of Chinese history and I could debate
with Professor Mearsheimer how to best characterize China as a country. I will
concede that China under communism is fundamentally oriented toward
materialism, and this has left it vulnerable to adopting the realist approach that
we see in U.S. foreign policy. There they are beginning to believe they also have
to compete by piling up lots of weapons and projecting aggression around the
world in an attempt to dominate their sphere of influences. Dealing with that
presents a losing prospect for the U.S. I do think that a return to legalism is really
the only way forward for the U.S. and I don't think we got anywhere by being
realists. However, China effectively owns the U.S. already. As economists are
telling us, we are not going to have more money than China in a few years. What
I would suggest, and what I have written in my new book, The Art of Law in the
International Community, is that we can invite cooperation for the good of the
planet as a whole; we can work with the Chinese to help them solve some of
their problems with corruption and over-emphasis on materialism in their own
system. This approach has left them unable to deal, for example, with the
coronavirus pandemic. The U.S., as a country founded upon the rule of law, can
begin to teach this. Sadly, it can't happen all at once—well, it might happen
quickly if we have another catastrophic disaster—and I'd rather see U.S. do this
incrementally because the realist ideas we heard from Professor Mearsheimer
run deep in China. We have to begin somewhere to show the benefit of moving
forward. I also agree that we have to try to revive the U.N. The realists have
really undermined the U.N; I've never seen it so weak. If President Trump is reelected, I can fully imagine the U.S. will leave the U.N.
Desch: Okay, Roger Alford is next on the list.
Alford: I think the entire debate is based on a faulty premise that international
law routinely rests on the question of the law of conflict. I think that the vast
majority of international law has nothing to do with this. It would be a bit like
saying when you go to law school all you talk about is criminal law and the
protection against violent crime. But international law is focused on dual
taxation treaties, contracts, aviation and open skies, telecommunications,
energy, environmental law, trade, monetary policy, extradition, intellectual
property, competition law, freedom of speech, among others. The vast majority
of international law has nothing to do with conflict.
Desch: John, this seems directed at you.
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Mearsheimer: I believe I said that. In response to Michael, I don't disagree. But
we do have these things called the laws of war and we do have wars, and wars
matter enormously. It matters more than all those other things you were talking
about.
Desch: Okay, we have a lot of questions piling up, and the carriage turns into a
pumpkin at 1:45, so I want to keep things moving along. The gentleman in the
blue suit in the front row.
Audience member 1: Professor O’Connell, you discussed the concept of natural
law. How do we defend international law if we equalize natural law to
international law or put it in the same bucket?
O'Connell: Oh yes. I didn't say this would be easy. We, and by “we” I mean the
U.S., have lost a lot of ground after the 60's, when we started to define success
in terms of keeping a technological and material advantage over others. And it
was at the same time that we lost a more comprehensive understanding of what
law even is and focused narrowly on the law we could make ourselves. Then we
thought that we could break the law because we are so powerful with all our
weapons. No one was going to force our compliance. America lost the idea that
it is the sanctity of treaties and the jus cogens peremptory norms that really
matters and we just don't know how to talk about them anymore. One of the big
commitments made by Notre Dame Law School is to resurrect this language
understanding. It will be up to people like you studying here at this law school
to help get that very difficult and challenging message out. I think you are up to
the task, because you have the ideas and see all the practical things that
international law does, including those that Professor Alford mentioned. You
understand fundamentally that you don't get those practical benefits unless
you're willing to accept—at some basic level—that it all applies, and that even
countries with lots of weapons don't get to pick and choose which laws they will
follow at will. Thus, the good parts of international law inevitably require some
self-sacrifice. I think it's in the spirit of generosity and other-orientedness. I don't
have a tragic view of life. I think we're capable of so much, and it's a matter of
unleashing it and getting ourselves out of this cul-de-sac that we've painted
ourselves into, especially in this very privileged country. So, thank you for being
here; help spread this word when you go back to Chile to teach.
Desch: Okay, I don't have a tragic view of life either, but I do have a tragic view
of the clock. So, we've got time for a very brief question from the gentleman in
the back.
Audience member 2: Professor O'Connell, you discussed militarism as in direct
opposition to legalism, but what happens when you have people who just won’t
obey the laws? For example, consider a situation where the military is broken
down or at least where military spending is cut. What stops the lawbreakers?
O'Connell: Law functions fundamentally first and foremost without coercion.
You need voluntary compliance with only a minimal threat of coercion. There's
no law that works because a policeman polices every moment of its enforcement,
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threatening penalties. That said, we have long accepted that some coercion is
certainly appropriate to signal the importance of a rule. Indeed, part of the reason
why we set up the United Nations—the reason envisioned by President Franklin
Roosevelt—was to have an effective response to the core rule behind the United
Nations Charter—the Article 2 prohibition against the use of force. Roosevelt
wanted a collective means to respond when core rules were violated. However,
what happened was the U.S. took advantage of its technological and military
superiority; instead of saying the U.S. would comply and respect the rules, it
tried to have its cake and eat it too. As a result, the U.N. is now dysfunctional as
a neutral enforcer of the law. It still has some coercive means left for responding
to crises, but even those have been badly abused by the United States. Economic
countermeasures could be a very effective means for enforcing the law short of
going to war. However, the United States is imposing countermeasures in
violation of the law such as right now in Iran. We have a lot of work to do before
these mechanisms function well. Thank you very much for your question.
Desch: Okay I'm going to read one more question and this could be a set up to
final remarks from our speakers, because I think it's addressed to both of you.
"Forgive me if I'm missing something basic, but I'm wondering what exactly is
at stake here? Is the debate descriptive in the sense that you are comparing
analytical frameworks for understanding states' actions or is it proscriptive in the
sense of advocating that states should act in a legalistic way?" What is at stake
here and if you want to fold in any last thoughts on anything else as well. John,
why don't you start out.
Mearsheimer: What is at stake is an important intellectual discussion about one
of the central issues of international politics and not much more needs to be said
about that. I'd make two additional points in the minutes allotted. I hope that
people don't believe I think that international law is irrelevant or bad and I went
to great lengths to make the case that I thought international law serves a very
important purpose. And Mary Ellen's comments cut in the other direction and
portray me as someone who is hostile to international law. I'm not. My main
point here is to emphasize the limits of international law when it comes to the
security realm. I think it is very important to understand that fact. You want to
know the strengths of international law and we've emphasized them here, me
included, as well as the limits, because it sharpens your mind. I think the key
limit boils down to the question asked earlier: what does legalism do when
confronted with Adolf Hitler? I don't believe Mary Ellen answered that question,
just like I don't believe she answered my question of how we should deal with
the Hobbesian dilemma.
O'Connell: Thank you. I think Professor Mearsheimer and I were both being
descriptive and proscriptive. We actually agreed quite a bit on what we're both
seeing in the world. He believes the way forward is with a good deal
of international law but not in the realm of military force, where it really counts.
I'm saying you can't enjoy the benefits of international law unless you're willing
to apply it to the military realm. International law is clear. There are times when
military force is lawful. The United States used military force lawfully one time
since the Second World War under the U.N. Charter. And that is the only time
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it has proven a general success: when we helped Kuwait become liberated from
Iraq after Iraq invaded in violation of the U.N. Charter in 1990. The world came
together at the U.N. and worked together to liberate Kuwait, and Kuwait has
been liberated for almost 30 years. Kuwait has maintained its independence
thanks to the U.N. Charter and not the kinds of regime change that Vice
President Cheney wanted, many of which would have gone beyond what
international law required. If that's my last word, even in the military realm,
obeying the law has extraordinary benefits, and can help us free up resources for
the challenges human beings really need to tackle.
Desch: I have one more task, and I ask John and Mary Ellen to come up right
next to me here. It's the end of the fifteenth round. I want you to join me in
thanking both the speakers for a terrific back-and-forth.

